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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN STATE-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME
COURT REDEFINES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hospital Association,
528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995)
I. FACTS
The North Dakota Hospital Association' [hereinafter NDHA] hired
Alan J. Schuhmacher in 1974 and Dale Wavra in 1981.2 After fifteen
years and eight years of employment respectively, NDHA terminated
Schuhmacher and Wavra due to an alleged financial crisis.3
Believing that NDHA had discriminated against Schuhmacher and
Wavra based on their ages, the two former employees sued NDHA under
the North Dakota Human Rights Act,4 claiming age discrimination. 5 At
trial, the jury found for Schuhmacher and Wavra and awarded them a
total of $730,000 in damages. 6 In addition, the district court awarded
1. NDHA is a nonprofit association consisting of independent hospitals and clinics. Schuhmacher
v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 376 (N.D. 1995). NDHA is funded mostly through
annual dues from its member hospitals and clinics. Id. NDHA's primary function is to facilitate the
purchasing of supplies and the collection of outstanding debts for its member institutions. Id. NDHA
has two profit-making subsidiaries: Advantage, NDHA's purchasing agent; and Hospital Services
Incorporated, NDHA's collection agency. Brief for Appellant at 2. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota
Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995) (No. 940155).
2. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 376.
3. Id. at 377. When NDHA discharged Schuhmacher, NDHA redistributed Schuhmacher's
duties among existing sales staff at Advantage. Id. In October of 1989, NDHA gave one of its staff
members at Advantage, Wade Johnson, who was 39 years of age, the title of Vice President, Chief
Operating Officer of Advantage, which is the position that Schuhmacher formerly held. Id. After
NDHA terminated Wavra, Hospital Services Incorporated moved from Grand Forks to Bismarck
where NDHA named Kim Rau "head collector" whose duties included overseeing the opening of the
Bismarck operation. Id. In January of 1991, NDHA promoted Rau, at the age of 32, to the position of
Vice President, which is the position that Wavra formerly held. Id.
4. N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -21 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
5. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 377. At the time of their terminations, Schuhmacher was 54
years of age and Wavra was 58 years of age. Id. at 376. The Human Rights Act of North Dakota is
codified in chapter 14-02.4 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -21
(1991 & Supp. 1995); see also Human Rights Act, ch. 173, 1983 N.D. Laws 466; STATE BAR
AssoctATON OF NORTH DAKOTA, THE NORTH DAKOTA HuMAN RiGHTS Acr AND You 1 (1985) (referring
to chapter 14-02.4 as the Human Rights Act of North Dakota). The Act provides:
It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, the presence of any mental or
physical disability, status with regard to marriage or public assistance, or
participation in lawful activity off the employer's premises during
nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (Supp. 1995).
6. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 377.
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$308,000 in costs and attorneys' fees, bringing the total judgment
against NDHA to over one million dollars.7
NDHA appealed both the jury's verdict and the district court's
award of costs and attorney's fees. 8 NDHA challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence and the district court's jury instructions, evidentiary
rulings, and award of attorneys' fees. 9 Specifically, NDHA argued four
major points.' 0 First, NDHA again argued that Schuhmacher and
Wavra's terminations were based on legitimate business reasons., I
Second, NDHA asserted that Schuhmacher and Wavra did not satisfy all
elements required to prove age discrimination as they were not required
to demonstrate that they were replaced after their terminations.1 2 Third,
NDHA argued that regardless of whether Schuhmacher and Wavra could
prove that they were replaced, Schuhmacher and Wavra failed to prove
that age was a "determining factor" in the terminations. 13 Finally,
NDHA argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury that
the replacement elementl 4 of a prima facie case could be satisfied by
showing that the plaintiffs' duties were either distributed among younger
existing employees or assumed by newly hired younger employees.' 5
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial
court's decision.' 6 In doing so, the supreme court held that the district
court's instructions did not adequately inform the jury of the applicable
law.17 In addition, the supreme court ruled that the district court errone-
ously excluded relevant evidence necessary to the defense.18
7. Brief for Appellant at 36, Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D.
1995) (No. 940155).
8. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 377.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the replacement element of a prima
facie case).
13. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 378. NDHA cited to authority which stated that a plaintiff, in a
business reorganization or reduction in force case, must not only prove that he or she was replaced,
but the plaintiff must also come forward with additional evidence that age was a "determining factor"
in the termination. Id. See Ridenour v. Lawson Co.. 791 F.2d 52, 57 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that a
plaintiff must come forward with additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that age was
a determining factor in the termination). NDHA also argued that the trial court improperly equated
salary-status decision making with age-based decision making. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 377.
See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706-07 (1993) (finding it improper to consider a
decision based on the employee's years of service to be "age-based").
14. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the jury instruction concerning the
replacement element of a prima facie case).
15. Schuhmacher. 528 N.W.2d at 379.
16. Id. at 376.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL LAW IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
1. Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964 and The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
In the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress passed Title VII, a federal
statutory law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.19 During the floor debate
over Title VII, both Senators and Representatives offered amendments to
include age as one of Title VII's protected classes. 20 However, oppo-
nents of the amendments argued that there was not enough information
on the nature of age discrimination. 2 1 This strong opposition to the
inclusion of age under Title VII ultimately resulted in the amendment's
defeat. 22
Although Congress did not include age as a protected class in Title
VII, Congress did provide a provision23 which directed the Secretary of
Labor to study the problem of age discrimination in employment and to
recommend remedial legislation to Congress. 24
Pursuant to this Congressional mandate, the Secretary of Labor
submitted his report, The Older American Workers-Age Discrimination
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229-33 (1983)
(discussing Title VU and the legislative history leading up to the passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act). Title VII regulates the relationship between employers and their employees and
applicants, between unions and their members and potential members, and between employment
agencies and their clients. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1988). However, Title VII does not prohibit
all arbitrary employment practices. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (1988). Rather, Title VII only
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. Id.
20. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 229 (discussing the Congressional debates leading up to the
passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). See Act of July 2, 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352,
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. (78 Stat.) 2355, 2401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (citing to the legislative
history of Title VII).
21. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (discussing that part of the argument against
inclusion of age discrimination in employment was the lack of information upon which to determine
whether there was a widespread problem).
22. Id. at 229-39. See 110 CoNG. R Ec. 2596-2599, 9911-9913, 13490-13492 (1964) (discussing
congressional hearings to the suggested amendments and the arguments against enactment).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 715.78 Stat. 265 (1964); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230 (noting that
42 U.S.C. § 715 has been superseded by § 10 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86
Stat. 111).
24. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230. One reason for the omission of age from Title VII is
that the legislation was already having difficulty passing Congress and the addition of another
protected category, age, would have created more opposition to the act. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, EMPtOYmENT DtSCRM1NATtoN LAW § 98.32, at 21-11, 21-12 (1992). Another reason for the
separate treatment of "age" is that many members of Congress believed that the EEOC would already
be overtaxed with race and sex cases, and that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor could handle age complaints more expediently. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in Employment (1965),25 to Congress which revealed evidence of wide-
spread age discrimination in employment in the United States. 26 In
response to the Secretary of Labor's findings, Congress passed the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967.27
Congress' purpose in enacting the ADEA was to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in the workplace and to help reconcile problems that
arise from the impact of age on employment. 28 In order to provide the
same employment protection to older Americans that Title VII provided
to its protected classes, Congress wrote the ADEA with similar substantive
provisions. 29 However unlike Title VII,30 which is enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Congress chose to use
the enforcement procedures of the Department of Labor, as defined in
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938.3'
2. Types of Claims Under the ADEA
Generally, in employment discrimination law, there are two primary
types of theories under which a claim may be brought: disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact.32
25. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230 (citing REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE
CONGRESS UNDER SECrbON 715 OF THE CiVIL uIGHTS Acr OF 1964, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER-AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (June 1965)).
26. Id.; see also 113 CONG. REC. 1377 (1967) (discussing the findings in the Secretary of Labor's
support for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
27. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 230-31 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 62i(b) (1982). See Act of
December 15, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. (81 Stat.) 2213 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
621) (citing to legislative history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
29. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (comparing Title VII's protection of women, minority,
racial, ethnic, and religious groups to the similar protection that the ADEA provides older workers).
30. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The most noticeable similarity between Title VII
and ADEA is the statutory language. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1989) (citing to the statutory
language of Title VII) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (referring to the similar statutory language).
The statutory language in Title VII and the ADEA is identical except that "age" represents the stated
"protected class" in the ADEA as opposed to Title VII's "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
31. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. One of the reasons Congress originally applied the procedural
provisions of the FLSA to ADEA claims was because of its expediency concerns that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission was already overloaded with race and sex cases. Kimberlye K.
Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967 and Trial By Jury: Proposals For
Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 606 (1987) (discussing why Congress chose to use the procedural
standard of the FLSA in the ADEA). However, in July of 1979, the Presidential Reorganization Plan
No. 1, transferred the enforcement of the ADEA to the EEOC. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 509 (1988). Therefore, the EEOC now enforces both the ADEA and Title VII.
Id.
32. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701. 1705 (1993).
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a. Disparate Treatment
The most common and easily understood type of ADEA claim is
the disparate treatment claim.33 Disparate treatment cases involve an
employee's claim that the employer has intentionally treated an employ-
ee less favorably because of the employee's age, race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 34  Thus, in employment discrimination cases
where the claim is disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove the
employer's discriminatory intent.35
(1) Types of Cases Under The Disparate Treatment
Theory
(a) Pretext Cases
Pretext cases arise when an employer asserts a nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision which the plaintiff seeks to discred-
it.36 To facilitate the plaintiff's burden in pretext cases, the United States
Supreme Court established a three-step analysis known as the McDonnell
Douglas standard, 37 which allows a plaintiff to use circumstantial evi-
dence to prove that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
intent. 38 This standard allocates the burden of proof each party bears. 39
The three stages of the McDonnell Douglas standard dictate the follow-
ing:
Stage I: The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of evidence a prima facie case of intentional discrimi-
nation.
33. Id.
34. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335-36 n.15 (1977)).
35. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d
487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
36. Kirschner v. Office of the Comptroller of New York, 973 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1992). The
courts have identified three ways to prove pretext: (1) the plaintiff may show that the employer's
reasons had no basis in fact; (2) the plaintiff may show that the reasons were not the real factors
motivating the discharge; or (3) the plaintiff may show that even if the reasons were factual, they
were jointly insufficient to motivate the discharge. Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d
1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiff needs to do more than establish a prima facie case
to prove basic age discrimination).
37. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a standard in
which the plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to show that the employer's employment decision
was intentional discrimination).
38. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-803.
19961 415
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Stage II: The employer has the burden of production to rebut
the presumption of discrimination by proffering a
non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision.
Stage III: The plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to show
that the reasons offered by the employer were merely pretext
for intentional discrimination and persuade the trier of fact that
discrimination was the real reason for the employment prac-
tice .40
In the first stage, the plaintiff has the initial burden of persuading
the fact finder that he or she has met the elements of the prima facie
case.4 1 Generally, a prima facie case is made up of four elements: (1)
the plaintiff is a member of the protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (3) the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) after the plaintiff was reject-
ed, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons with the complainant's qualifications.42
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision.4 3 Here, the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
must be specific enough to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff.44
In the third and final stage, if the employer carries its burden of
production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason
given by the employer was a pretext for intentional discrimination. 45
The plaintiff may show pretext by persuading the court that a discrimi-
natory reason more likely motivated the employer or by showing that
the employer's proffered explanation is false.46
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas standard for allocating
the burdens of each party and the order of presentation of proof in a case alleging discriminatory
treatment).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The elements necessary to establish a prima facie case
vary depending on the circumstances of the alleged discrimination, such as showing that a plaintiff
belongs to a racial minority where the plaintiff alleges race discrimination. Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d
1235, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1992)). In fact, the
Supreme Court has noted that the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
42. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. At this stage, the employer does not need to litigate the merits of its
reasoning for its decision, nor does the employer need to persuade the fact finder that it was actually
motivated by its proffered reasoning. Id.
44. ld. at 254-55.
45. Id. at 255.
46. Id. at 256 (noting that the plaintiff always retains the burden of persuasion that he or she was
the victim of intentional discrimination). See McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 804-805 (discussing the
416 [VOL. 72:411
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Until recently, the federal courts were divided over whether a
plaintiff was entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law, when the employ-
er's proffered reasons for its employment practices were rejected by the
trier of fact.47 This controversy, however, was settled by the Supreme
Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.48 In Hicks, the Court held
that a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if he or
she proves the employer's asserted reasons were false or if the trier of
fact rejects the employer's stated reasons. 49 The Court, restating its
reasoning in Burdine,50 concluded that the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact remains, at all times, with the plaintiff.5 1 Thus, the
Court determined that simply disbelieving the employer's stated reasons
is not enough for a plaintiff to prevail.52 Rather, the Court opined that
the fact finder must also believe the plaintiff's explanation for the
intentional discrimination. 53 Accordingly, for a plaintiff to prevail, the
plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that the employer's proffered
reasons are false and that discrimination was the true reason for the
employment decision.54
(b) Mixed-Motives Cases
Mixed-motives cases arise when an employer proffers both a
legitimate and a discriminatory reason for its employment decision. 55 In
the landmark mixed-motives case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,56 a
female partnership candidate was refused admission as partner in her
accounting firm. 57 She sued under Title VII alleging that her firm had
discriminated against her on the basis of sex in its partnership deci-
sions. 58 In its defense, the firm stated that although some partners felt
that Ms. Hopkins was not feminine enough, its ultimate reason for
refusing to admit Ms. Hopkins as a partner was because she lacked
sufficient interpersonal skills.59
methods in which the petitioner may show a pretext for discrimination). See supra note 36 (discussing
the different methods that courts have identified in finding pretext).
47. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,2750 (1993).
48. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
49. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,2754-55 (1993).
50. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
5 1. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981)).
52. Id. at 2754.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2752.
55. Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989)).
56. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
57. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989).
58. Id. at 232.
59. Id. at 234-37.
1996] 417
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Facing a mixed-motive discrimination case for the first time, the
United States Supreme Court determined that in order to prevail, a
plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that the discriminatory
factor played a motivating part in the employment decision. 60 Accord-
ingly, the case was remanded with the instructions that if the plaintiff
successfully proves that the discriminatory reason was a motivating
factor in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the unlawful factor into account.6 1
(c) Reduction-in-Force Cases
Under the ADEA, an employer may make employment decisions
based on reasonable factors other than age or for good cause.62 Specifi-
cally, an employer may justify the termination of an employee by
claiming that a reduction-in-force [hereinafter RIF] is dictated by an
economic necessity. 63 As a result, when a company undergoes a RIF due
to economic necessity, terminated employees face a more difficult
burden in proving age discrimination. 64 Normally, in non-reduction-in-
force cases, the fourth element of a prima facie case requires the plaintiff
to merely show that, after the discharge, the position remained open and
the employer sought applicants with similar qualifications to fill the
position. 65  However, RIF situations complicate matters because the
plaintiff's position is either eliminated or combined with another posi-
60. Id. at 243-47.
61. See Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)). Trial courts determine whether a given disparate treatment case
should be analyzed as a pretext or a mixed motive case after all the evidence has been presented. Id.
If there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the court considers the claim a pretext case and
applies the McDonnell Douglas standard. Id. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has produced direct
evidence that the employer's decision was motivated by a discriminatory factor, the court considers
the claim a mixed motive case and applies the Price Waterhouse analysis. Id.
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act by adding a new subsection which states that an
unlawful employment practice is automatically established whenever a complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992). By adding this subsection to the Act,
a defendant is now liable for any impermissible employment practice even though other factors may
have also motivated the employer's decision. Id. Nevertheless, the amendment still allows an
employer, in a mixed motive claim, to escape compensatory and punitive damages, but may require
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or back pay, by showing that the same decision would have been
made even without considering the discriminatory factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1992). In
addition, the employer may be liable for declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and
costs. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1993).
63. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1168 (8th Cir. 1985). See also 29 U.S.C. § 623(")
(1988) (referring to business necessity as an employer's defense to liability under the ADEA because
a business necessity is considered a good cause for termination).
64. Holley, 771 F.2d at 1165-66.
65. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792. 802 (1973).
418
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tion and it does not remain open. 66 Therefore, in RIF cases, many courts
require a plaintiff to present additional evidence to prove that age was a
factor in the termination in order to establish the prima facie case. 67
b. Disparate Impact
Another type of claim that may be recognized under the ADEA is
disparate impact. Disparate impact cases involve employment practices
that are facially neutral 68 in their treatment of different groups but have
a significant adverse effect on a protected group compared to
nonprotected groups. 69 Therefore, in a disparate impact claim, the issue
is whether the actual consequences of the employment practices are
discriminatory, regardless of the employer's motivation. 70
In Griggs v. Dukes Power Co.,71 the United States Supreme Court
established a separate and distinct test for claims involving disparate
impact. 72 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demon-
strating that a facially neutral employment practice has a significant
discriminatory impact. 73 Next, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that there is a business
66. Id. See generally Holley, 771 F.2d 1161.
67. Holley, 771 F.2d at 1166 (quoting LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090-91
(6th Cir. 1984)). While the plaintiff need not show replacement by a younger worker to make out a
prima facie case, the plaintiff must provide either direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending
to indicate that the employer discharged the plaintiff for unlawful reasons. Barnes v. Gencorp, Inc.,
896 F.2d 1457, 1464-65 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796,
800 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that in a reduction-in-force termination the plaintiff is required to make an
additional showing that age was a factor in his termination); Leichiman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d
1263, 1268 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 885 (1987) (stating that age must be a "determining
factor" in termination); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011. 1014 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding
reversible error in failing to require that the prima facie case include a showing of age as a factor in
the reduction in force demotion). But see Wallis v. J. R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that his job duties were assumed
by a retained younger employee); Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
that a plaintiff may satisfy the requirement element of a prima facie case by showing that persons
outside protected group were retained in the same position).
68. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-36 (1971) (finding that the hiring
requirements and testing practices of Duke Power Company, although neutral in terms of intent,
operated to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices).
69. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)).
70. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
71. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
72. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. 401 U.S. 424,428-36 (1971).
73. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (discussing the Griggs three-part
analysis for disparate impact claims). The standard of proof by which a plaintiff must show the prima
facie case is by a preponderance of the evidence. EEOC v. High Top Coal Co.. 677 F.2d 1136, 1137
(6th Cir. 1982) (discussing how a plaintiff can establish a claim under the disparate impact theory).
Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a
disparate impact, except when the plaintiff is able to show that the elements of the employer's decision
making process are not capable of separation for analysis. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (Supp. V
1993).
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necessity for the challenged practice. 74 At this point, the employer's
burden is more onerous than the employer's burden in a disparate
treatment claim. 75 An employer cannot demonstrate that an employ-
ment practice is a business necessity by simply showing that the practice
serves legitimate management functions. 76 Rather, the employer must
show that the practice has great importance to the job.77 Furthermore,
the employer must also show a "manifest relationship" between the job
requirement in question and the employment. 78
Finally, if the employer proves job relatedness or business necessity
for the employment practice in question, the plaintiff is then given an
opportunity to show there are alternatives to the employer's employment
practices that would have a less discriminatory effect but would still serve
the employer's business interests. 79 If the plaintiff demonstrates a less
discriminatory or nondiscriminatory alternative, the plaintiff successfully
establishes disparate impact under the Griggs test. 80
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized disparate
impact claims under Title VII, the Court has not yet established whether
a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA.81 In a
recent ADEA decision, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,82 Justice Kennedy
wrote a concurring opinion specifically noting that nothing in the
Court's opinion should be read as incorporating the disparate impact
theory into the ADEA.83 However, lower federal courts have recognized
ADEA disparate impact claims in both pre-Biggins and post-Biggins
decisions .84
74, See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (discussing the employer's burden in the second stage of the
disparate impact analysis). In Griggs, while referring to the employer's burden, the Court used the
terms "business necessity" and "related to job performance" interchangeably. Id. at 431.
75. See Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1014 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that in stage
two of a disparate treatment claim, an employer must only articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason).
76. See Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist.. 641 F.2d 835, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1981) (discus-
sing how an employer meets his or her burden by showing that the employment practice serves a
legitimate business necessity).
77. Id.
78. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. A manifest relationship means that there is a demonstrable
relationship to capable performance of the jobs for which the practice is used. Id.
79. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975) (discussing the plaintiff's burden
when demonstrating alternatives to the employer's employment practices).
80. Id.
8 1. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993).
82. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
83. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701. 1710 (1993).
84. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (employing
statistical evidence to establish disparate impact in an age discrimination case brought under the
ADEA); Howell v. Levi Strauss & Co., 840 F. Supp. 132, 136 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (discussing the
disparate impact theory under Title VII or the ADEA); Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33.
35-36 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA); Leidig v.
Honeywell, 850 F. Supp. 796, 801-02 (D. Minn. 1994) (assuming that a disparate impact claim is
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In Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hospital Association,85 the
plaintiffs alleged only disparate treatment, claiming they were intention-
ally discriminated against based on their age. 86  The plaintiffs in
Schuhmacher relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence for their
discrimination claim.87 Furthermore, NDHA claimed that it terminated
both plaintiffs due to a reduction-in-force. 88  This comment will there-
fore focus solely on disparate treatment in a reduction-in-force situation
with respect to the North Dakota Supreme Court's modified version of
the McDonnell Douglas89 standard as established in Schweigert v.
Provident Life Insurance Co.90
B. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT'S ADOPTION OF FEDERAL
LAW TO REVIEW STATE-BASED DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
1. The North Dakota Human Rights Act
In 1983, the North Dakota Legislature enacted the Human Rights
Act, 91 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, and other discriminatory factors. 92 The Act is
intended to prevent and eliminate discrimination in employment rela-
tions, public accommodations, public services, and credit transactions. 93
The Act also functions to deter those who aid, abet, induce discrimina-
tion, or coerce others to discriminate. 94 In enacting the Human Rights
cognizable under the ADEA for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment). But see EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 883 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (N.D. III. 1995) (holding that a claim for disparate
impact does not exist under the ADEA).
85. 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995).
86. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 377 (N.D. 1995).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing the framework of the McDonnell
Douglas standard).
90. 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993). For further information about Schweigert v. Provident Life
Ins. Co, see Nicholas W. Chase, Comment, Civil Rights-Employment Discrimination: Modifying
Federal Standards To Reflect Principles Of State Law: The North Dakota Supreme Court's
Examination Of The Hicks Rationale Prompts The Court To Customize Its Own Standard To Review
State-Based Employment Discrimination Claims, 70 N.D. L. REV. 207 (1994).
91. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -21 (1991 & Supp. 1995). Prior to the 1983 Legislative
Session, the North Dakota Legislature had considered two bills relating to human rights. REPORT OF
THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 46TH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 163-65 (1979). During the
1977 Legislative Session, two human rights bills were introduced, but both failed to pass. Id. One of
the bills was entitled the North Dakota Human Rights Act of 1977. Id. This bill prohibited
discrimination because of race: color; creed: religion; sex; ancestry; national origin: age; marital
status; the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; or status with regard to public
assistance. Id. The other bill relating to human rights was entitled the North Dakota Equal
Employment Opportunity Act. Id. This bill prohibited employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, or licensing agencies from discriminating in employment practices. Id.
92. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 188 (N.D. 1989) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.4-01).
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01.
94. Id.
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Act, the North Dakota Legislature sought to afford North Dakotans the
right to advance discrimination cases in the state courts rather than
federal courts.95
2. The North Dakota Supreme Court's Interpretation of the
North Dakota Human Rights Act and Federal Law
The North Dakota Supreme Court first reviewed an employment
discrimination claim under the North Dakota Human Rights Act in
Moses v. Burleigh County 96 in which the plaintiff claimed race and sex
discrimination. 97 On appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Moses'
claim, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case, recommend-
ing that the trial court perform analysis similar to the McDonnell Doug-
las standard .98 The supreme court ordered the trial court to allow the
defendants to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployment decision, and then to allow Moses an opportunity to prove that
the employment decision was pretextual. 99
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court's apparent adoption of
the McDonnell Douglas federal standard to analyze claims brought
under the North Dakota Human Rights Act was clearly a matter of
controversy among the court.100 Justice Levine, in her concurring and
dissenting opinion, argued in favor of the majority's use of federal law
to analyze state law.'Ol Justice Levine stated that "[flederal law is a rich
resource which we would be foolish to ignore . . .'where federal law has
ironed out some wrinkles, we should take advantage of that experi-
ence." 102 Conversely, Justice Vande Walle, concurring in part and
95. STATE BAR ASS'N OF N. D.. THE NORTH DAKOTA HUMAN ROIs ACT AND YOu 1 (1985). In the
case of age discrimination, the Act covers persons at least forty years of age. N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.4-02. However, the Act does not prohibit compulsory retirement of an employee who reaches
the age of sixty-five. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03.
96. 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989). The supreme court had reviewed other employment discrimi-
nation cases prior to Moses, but had dismissed them for lack of evidence showing discrimination. See
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987) (holding that "the mere
assertion that one is overweight or obese is not alone adequate to make a claimant one of the class of
persons afforded relief for discrimination," thus, requiring something more be shown); Hillesland v.
Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 215 (N.D. 1987) (finding that the plaintiff had "failed to
offer any evidentiary showing [to] support a jury finding of age discrimination").
97. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 187 (N.D. 1989). In Moses, Leora Moses, an
African-American woman, sued the Sheriff and Burleigh County claiming she was discriminated
against in her employment because of her race and sex. Id.
98. Id. at 189 n.3.
99. ld. at 191-92.
100. Id. at 194-97 (VandeWalle. J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Levine, J.. con-
curring and dissenting).
101. Id. at 197 (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
102. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 197 (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
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dissenting in part, criticized the majority's use of federal law, arguing
that:
It is apparent there are substantial similarities, but if we are to
be an echo of the Federal Act there would appear to be little
need for our own statutes on the matter....
... Where the reason for the Federal rationale does not exist in
North Dakota there is no reason we should adopt it indiscrimi-
nately. 103
In 1993, the North Dakota Supreme Court revisited the McDonnell
Douglas standard.104 In Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,10 5 the trial
court applied the McDonnell Douglas standard to a sex discrimination in
employment claim finding in favor of the defendant, Provident Life,
since it found Provident Life was not motivated by discriminatory
reasons. 106
On appeal, however, the supreme court rejected the trial court's
complete adoption of the McDonnell Douglas standard.107 Of signifi-
cance was the court's finding that the McDonnell Douglas standard was
somewhat contradictory to the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.1 08 The
supreme court noted that under the McDonnell Douglas standard, after a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the presumption of discrimi-
nation shifts only the burden of production to the defendant.109 Howev-
er, the supreme court pointed out that Rule 301 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence requires that a defendant has the burden of proving
that the presumed fact does not exist. 110 Therefore, to resolve the
103. Id. at 195-96 (Vande Walle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (referring to the McDonnell Douglas stand-
ard and the burdens allocated to each party).
105. 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
106. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225,229 (N.D. 1993). In Schweigert, the
plaintiff, Jocelyn Martin, iled suit against Provident Life when she was terminated as part of a
business reorganization. Id. at 226. She claimed sex discrimination in violation of the North Dakota
Human Rights Act. Id.
107. Id. at 229.
108. Id. at 228-29. See also N.D. R. EVm. 301; FED. R, EvD. 301.
109. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 228. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing N.D.
R. EVID. 301). Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FFD. R. EVID. 301.
110. Schweigert. 503 N.W.2d at 228-29. Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
provides:
If facts giving rise to a presumption are established by credible evidence, the
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discrepancy, the North Dakota Supreme Court parted from federal law,
providing a new standard which reconciles North Dakota Rule 301 with
the McDonnell Douglas standard."I'
Unlike the three-step federal standard, the Schweigert court's
standard only had two steps."12 The Schweigert court's standard is as
follows:
Stage I: The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.
Stage II: If the plaintiff meets his or her burden of persuasion,
the defendant then has the burden of persuasion to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that his or her employment decision was based
on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the employer
fails to meet this burden, the plaintiff prevails; if the employer
meets his or her burden, the employer prevails.113
The Schweigert standard differs from the McDonnell Douglas
standard in that, in the second stage, the employer has the burden of
persuasion, which is required by the North Dakota Rules of Evidence,
rather than the burden of production, as the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard requires."l 4 Thus, in the second stage, the employer must not
simply articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employ-
ment decision, but the employer must prove that the legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason existed when making the employment decision.ll 5
presumption substitutes for evidence of the existence of the fact presumed until the trier
of fact finds from credible evidence that the fact presumed does not exist, in which event
the presumption is rebutted and ceases to operate. A party against whom a presumption
is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than its existence.
N.D. R. EvID. 301. Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides that a presumption
imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving its nonexistence.
N.D.R.EvID. 301 (explanatory note). Thus, the North Dakota rule gives presumptions a stronger effect
than they are given under Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which imposes only a burden of
producing evidence to rebut a presumption. Id.
Accompanying Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the two competing theories
concerning the function of presumptions are discussed in the explanatory note. Id. Under the first
theory, a presumption is stated in terms of its effect on the burden of proof. Id. Thus a presumption
operates to "shift" the original burden of proof to the opponent of the presumption. Id. Under what is
known as the "bursting bubble" theory, "a presumption imposes upon its opponent a burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut the presumption; once this is done, the presumption disappears." Id.
I 1l. Schweigerr, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 228-29.
115. Id. Because the burden of proof is higher than the burden of production, Stage III under
federal law is not necessary under the North Dakota standard. See supra notes 40-46 and
accompanying text (citing to the McDonnell Douglas standard).
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hospital Ass'n,116 the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment on two
grounds."l 7 First, the court found that the district court's jury instruc-
tions did not inform the jury of the applicable law.118 Second, the court
found that evidence relevant to the defense was erroneously excluded."19
Most significantly, however, was the Schuhmacher court's review and
criticism of the Schweigert standard to review employment discrimina-
tion claims under the North Dakota Human Rights Act. 120
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF THE SCHWEIGERT STANDARD
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court in Schweigertl21 only
recently established a new standard of review for state-based discrimina-
tion claims, the Schuhmacher majority seemed to criticize its earlier
ruling in Schweigert.122 Under Schweigert, the plaintiff's only burden
was to establish a prima facie case, and after doing so, the burden of
persuasion shifted to the defendant to prove that the alleged discrimina-
tory practice did not play a part in the employment decision.1 23 Howev-
er, in Schuhmacher, the court questioned this standard. 124 According to
the Schweigert decision, a plaintiff may prevail merely by satisfying the
prima facie case if the defendant cannot prove a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason. 125 Thus, a plaintiff, without actually providing any
evidence that the decision was "because of" discrimination, may prevail
simply because the jury disbelieves the defendant's proffered reason.126
The court reasoned that although the Schweigert standard is consistent
with Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the standard
incorrectly eliminated the North Dakota Human Rights Act's 127 statutory
element of proof that the employment decision was "because of"
116. 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995).
117. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 376 (N.D. 1995).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 378.
121. 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
122. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374,378 (N.D. 1995).
123. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993). See supra notes
116-18 and accompanying text (referring to the Schweigert standard).
124. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 379.
125. Id. at 384 (Neumann, J., concurring). Consequently, the Schuhmacher court ruled that "a
properly-instructed jury which finds by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of age
discrimination while disbelieving the defendant's alternative explanations ... could viably conclude
that the defendant illegally discriminated on the basis of age." Id. at 379.
126. Id. at 383 (Meschke, J., concurring).
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
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discrimination. 128 The court in Schuhmacher stated that the ultimate
burden of proof should be on the plaintiff, as it is in federal law.129
The majority's apparent condemnation of the Schweigert decision
fueled the long-standing controversy over the adoption of federal
standards to analyze state law, thus prompting separate opinions from
Justices Meschke and Neumann.130 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Meschke objected to the majority's ruling on the grounds that it em-
ployed the federal framework rather than the Schweigert framework.131
Justice Meschke stated that the Schweigert court modified the federal
standard in order to reflect the evidentiary principles of North Dakota
law.132 Justice Meschke reasoned that these principles state that a jury
must conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated if they find
that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and they disbelieve
the employer's proffered reasons. 133 Thus, Justice Meschke concluded
that the majority undermined what it had sought to accomplish in
Schweigert-a framework which was consistent with North Dakota
law.134
Justice Neumann concurred with the majority, but also criticized the
majority for not providing trial courts with a definite direction to follow
when faced with employment discrimination cases under the North
Dakota Human Rights Act. 135 Challenging the majority's opinion,
Justice Neumann questioned whether an employee could lose a lawsuit
even though the employee successfully proved a prima facie case and
the employer failed to rebut it.136 If the majority did not intend for a
complainant to win under these circumstances, Justice Neumann posed
another possibility of the effect of the court's ruling on the employee's
case. 137 Justice Neumann reasoned that it may be possible that when an
employer fails to meet his or her burden of proof, that failure could
constitute the missing evidence of intentional discrimination and thus
128. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 379.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 383-85 (Meschke, J., concurring; and Neumann, J., concurring). See supra notes
115-18 and accompanying text (referring to the North Dakota Supreme Court's reconciliation of N.D.
R. EVID. 301 and FED. R. Evm. 301).
131. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 383-84 (Meschke, J., concurring).
132. Id. See Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 228-29 (1993) (discussing
the contradiction between North Dakota and federal evidentiary principles).
133. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 383-84 (Meschke, J., concurring).
134. Id. Additionally, Justice Meschke criticized the majority's implementation of federal law
because the North Dakota Human Rights Act covers all types of employment discrimination, while the
federal counterparts are "fragmented, separate, and often differently construed for different kinds of
discrimination." Id. Therefore, Justice Meschke asserted that using federal law to interpret North
Dakota's Human Rights Act was of little value to the court. Id. at 384.
135. Id. at 384-85 (Neumann, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 384.
137. Id.
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allow the plaintiff to prevail without having to directly prove intentional
discrimination. 138 Regardless of which possibility the supreme court
intended in its ruling, Justice Neumann concluded that the court's ruling
illustrates federal evidentiary principles rather than the state principles
enunciated in Schweigert.139
B. INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
BROUGHT UNDER THE NORTH DAKOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
1. The Replacement Element
In Schuhmacher,140 the supreme court also overturned the district
court's jury instruction that the replacement element of a prima facie
case could be demonstrated by showing that "the plaintiff's duties were
either distributed among younger employees or assumed by newly-hired
younger employees." 14 1 The supreme court rejected this instruction,
reasoning that in RIF cases it is inappropriate to focus on whether a
plaintiff was replaced since a plaintiff's position is usually eliminated. 142
Although the Schuhmacher court did not specify what is required to
satisfy the replacement element in a RIF case, the court firmly stated that
a plaintiff must come forward with further evidence that he or she was
unlawfully discharged.1 43
The court opined that if a plaintiff merely has to show that his or
her duties were distributed among younger retained employees, the
employer would be subjected to an age discrimination case any time an
employer laid off an older employee.144 Furthermore, the court pointed
out that firing an employee who is over forty is not prohibited by the
North Dakota Human Rights Act. 145 Rather, the North Dakota Human
138. Schuhmacher. 528 N.W.2d at 384 (Neumann, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995).
141. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374.379 (N.D. 1995).
142. Id. at 378-80. The supreme court found that the plaintiffs must have assumed that the
Schweigert majority believed that the replacement element could be demonstrated "by a showing that
a plaintiff's job duties were distributed among younger, retained employees." Id. at 380.
Schuhmacher and Wavra's argument was that the Schweigert majority must have found a prima facie
case by holding that the defendant's proffered explanations were not pretext for discrimination. Id.
However, the Schuhmacher court opined that the Schweigert majority did not delineate the elements of
a prima facie case because the defendant never challenged that issue. Id. The Schweigert court did,
however, note that the elements are generally that: (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected
class. (2) the plaintiff was satisfactorily performing the job duties; (3) the plaintiff was discharged; and
(4) others in the protected class were treated more favorably. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,
503 N.W.2d 225. 227 n.2 (N.D. 1993).
143. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 378-80.
144. Id. at 380-81.
145. Id. at 381.
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Rights Act only prohibits firing an employee because he or she is over
forty.146
2. Age Versus Years of Service
Also on review, the supreme court admonished the district court for
its instruction regarding the relative costs associated with older work-
ers. 147 At trial, the district court instructed the jury to find for the plain-
tiffs if it found that a motivating factor in the termination was that the
plaintiffs were paid more than their younger replacements. 148 The
district court further instructed the jury that it did not have to find that
age was the sole or main reason for the termination.149 In admonishing
the district court, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,150 in
stating "that '[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically distinct,
an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus
it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessari-
ly 'age based'."151 Accordingly, the supreme court ruled that it is
impermissible to take into account any factors other than the factor or
factors being alleged in the discrimination claim. 152
3. The "At-Will" Employment Doctrine
Although the supreme court found that the district court made
several errors when instructing the jury, the supreme court concluded
that the erroneous instructions would not have been as prejudicial if the
district court would have instructed the jury on the "at-will" employ-
ment doctrine.153 Under North Dakota law, employment that has no
definite term is presumed to be "at-will." 154 Thus, an employer has the
right to terminate the employee with or without cause. 155 The supreme
court found that the district court should have instructed the jury on the
"at-will" employment doctrine for two reasons. 156 First, the supreme
146. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-02 to 03 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (referring to the
plain language of the statute that it is unlawful to fire an employee because of the employee's age).
147. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 381.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
151. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 382.
152. Id. at 381-82.
153. Id. at 382.
154. Bykonen v. United Hosp., 479 N.W.2d 140-49 (N.D. 1992) (stating the general rule for
at-will employment in North Dakota). The "at-will" doctrine provides that "[a]n employment having
no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, except when
otherwise provided by this title." N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987).
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987).
156. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n. 528 N.W.2d 374. 382 (N.D. 1995).
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court viewed Schuhmacher and Wavra as "at-will" employees and
therefore the doctrine was applicable.157 And secondly, because much
of the plaintiffs' case was made by questioning the credibility of the
defendant's actions, the court reasoned that the jury could have errone-
ously based a finding of discrimination on its own perception of the
defendant's sound business judgment, unless it was cautioned that it may
not base a decision on such considerations.1 58
In his concurring opinion, Justice Meschke criticized the majority's
mandate of instructing on the "at-will" doctrine, because under the
North Dakota Human Rights Act, 159 an employer must justify its em-
ployment decision with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.1 60
Therefore, an employer faced with an employment discrimination claim
under the North Dakota Human Rights Act cannot fire an employee for
any reason, or no reason at all. 161
IV. IMPACT
In future discrimination cases under the North Dakota Human
Rights Act, district courts will have to reconcile the supreme court's two
seemingly contradictory opinions.162 Under Schweigert, the plaintiff's
only burden was to establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination. 163 And, as the United States Supreme Court noted in
Burdine,164 the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case is not
onerous. 165 However, under Schuhmacher, it appears as though the
plaintiff must not only establish a prima facie case, but also come
forward with additional information to prove that the employer's
proffered reason or reasons were pretext for intentional
discrimination. 166
In Schuhmacher, the North Dakota Supreme Court's criticism of its
previous ruling in Schweigert created many unanswered questions and
undoubtedly leaves both attorneys and trial courts confused.167 When
future plaintiffs can prove a prima facie case, it is unclear what strength
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -21 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
160. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 384 (Meschke, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1995); Schweigert v.
Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
163. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
164. 450 U.S 248 (1981).
165. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248.253 (1981).
166. Schuhmacher. 528 N.W.2d at 379.
167. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (referring to Justice Neumann's concur-
rence which poses many of the questions the supreme court leaves unanswered in its opinion).
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that presumption of discrimination will carry. Under Schweigert, it was
clear that after a plaintiff proved his or her prima facie case, the burden
of persuasion would shift to the employer.168 However, in light of the
Schuhmacher court's criticism of the Schweigert decision, employers
.may only have to satisfy a burden of production.169 Furthermore, it is
uncertain whether a plaintiff must prove "pretext," following the
employer's rebuttal of the presumption of discrimination. Therefore,
attorneys will be forced to argue the supreme court's holdings in
Schuhmacher and Schweigert.
In theory, the Schweigert standard is clearly more favorable to
plaintiffs than Schuhmacher. However, in the final analysis, the distinc-
tion between the two cases may never amount to anything that would
affect the outcome of a case. In a jury trial, if the court were to follow
the Schweigert standard l70 and the employer successfully articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff would obviously want
to present rebuttal evidence to prove that the employer's reasons were
false. The only noticeable difference between the two standards is that
under Schweigert, the plaintiff does not necessarily have to present
additional evidence after proving the prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 17 1 According to Schweigert, the court is mandated to find for the
plaintiff if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the employer's
proffered reasons are discredited. 172 In Schuhmacher, on the other
hand, an employer could conceivably fail to articulate nondiscriminatory
reasons and possibly still prevail.173 Regardless, the difference in jury
instructions may not play a significant role as it is questionable whether a
jury would find for the employer if he or she was unable to explain his
or her reason for the 'employment decision or if he or she offered an
explanation which was proven to be blatantly false. 174
The urgency of reconciling the ambiguity resulting from the
Schuhmacher opinion is further dramatized when considering the fact
168. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 229 (N.D. 1993) (applying the
requirements of N.D. R. EVID. 301).
169. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 379.
170. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Schuhmacher, 528 N.W.2d at 379.
174. Although the supreme court admonished the trial court for not instructing the jury on the
"at-will" employment doctrine, it is uncertain whether the supreme court intended for trial courts to
routinely instruct juries on this doctrine in all employment discrimination cases. Id. at 382. In
Schuhmacher, the court admonished the trial court on this issue only because it found other jury
instructions erroneous. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that if the trial court would have instructed the
jury on the "at-will" doctrine, the jury instructions, as a whole, would not have been as prejudicial. Id.
Nevertheless, the court did not fully explain whether or not a trial court has to instruct juries on the
"at-will" employment doctrine when the instructions are not otherwise erroneous. Id. at 382-83.
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that a majority of North Dakota employees rely exclusively on state
anti-discrimination protection. As of 1993, there were a total of 22,208
employers in North Dakota.175 Of those employers, 19,731, or 88.8%
had fewer than 20 employees.1 76 This statistic is significant because it
demonstrates the importance of the North Dakota Human Rights Act for
the vast majority of employees in the State who would otherwise not be
able to file claims under the applicable federal statutes on account of the
employer not employing the sufficient number of persons required by
those statutes. 177 Furthermore, one of the main purposes of the Act was
to provide North Dakotans with the right to take their discrimination
cases through the state courts rather than the federal courts. However,
after Schuhmacher, those employees who have the ability to choose
either state or federal court may just as well choose the federal court
because the state court will not provide them with a more favorable
forum.
Although the supreme court has purported that federal law is not
binding on our state interpretation and enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws,178 it is apparent that federal precedents will have
a great influence in the final outcome of discrimination cases. Recently,
because of diversity of citizenship, an age discrimination case brought
under the North Dakota Human Rights Act was litigated in the United
States District Court for the District of North Dakota Northeastern
Division.179 In this case, the federal district court was forced to establish
the standard of review in a state-based discrimination claim.180 Ultimate-
ly, the federal district court's jury instructions -reflected the framework
established by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Schuhmacher.181 In
175. Telephone Interview with Tom Pederson. Director of Research and Statistics, Job Service
North Dakota (Nov. 7, 1995).
176. Id.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (referring to Title VII which applies to employers of
fifteen or more employees); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988) (referring to the ADEA which applies to
employers of twenty or more employees): 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991) (referring to the
ADA which applies to employers of fifteen or more employees).
178. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 197 (N.D. 1989).
179. See Dahl v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 37 Civ. (D.N.D. filed Jan. 11, 1996) (No. A2-95-9).
180. Id.
181. Id. The United States District Court added a third Schweigert stage which instructed the jury
as follows:
If, on the other hand, defendant has produced evidence of a reason other than age for its
actions, you may find for the defendant unless plaintiff has proven that the reason given
by the defendant was not the true reason for the action, or that the plaintiff's age more
likely than not was a determining factor in the adverse decision.
Id. (referring to jury instruction number 10 entitled "Essential Elements of Plaintiff's Claim- Indirect
Evidence").
1996]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
that case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, but the
significance of the jury instruction remains uncertain.182
When the supreme court formulated the Schweigert standard, it
injected the principles of Rule 301 of the North Dakota Rules of Evi-
dence into the existing federal standard because the federal standard
would have otherwise contradicted North Dakota evidentiary princi-
ples.183 Now, however, the supreme court has arguably undone that
which it sought to accomplish in Schweigert-a standard that compli-
ments North Dakota law.
Jennifer L. Thompson
182. Id.
183. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 229 (N.D. 1993).
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